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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Defining and Defending America's Vital Interest

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Executive summary
Defining and Defending America's Vital Interest

Events of the last 10 years have demonstrated a pattern in the use of military force. This pattern shows a causal relationship between market considerations, regional stability, and American economic interest that leads to a threshold for using force. Additionally, these same factors drive the degree by which that force is used. Interestingly, even in our day of instant and graphic news, this pattern indicates that human suffering, an important ingredient in shaping response, will not in itself drive the US to use force.

The American military has engaged in numerous deployments, shows of force, and humanitarian efforts in the last 10 years. Yet this military force has seen only two major coalition conflicts during this period--the Gulf war of 1991 and the Kosovo Conflict of 1998. While both of these conflicts had their share of human crisis, neither saw the 1990's worst atrocities. The crimes committed against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were horrendous, yet these crimes paled in comparison to the carnage and suffering in Rwanda that occurred during the same decade.

While American forces were employed to end the suffering in Kosovo and Kuwait, recent history indicates the level of atrocity does not, by itself, determine the use of force. American leadership categorically ruled out committing ground forces in order to stop the "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo. NATO countries were willing to move against the unstable actions in Serbia, but not at the expense of large coalition casualties in a southeastern European land war. Eight years earlier America brought "overwhelming force" against the dictator Saddam Hussein. While the world was outraged by what CNN called the "Rape of Kuwait", there was more than sovereignty at issue. Central to the

American decision to use force, markets and economists were also outraged at the prospect of instability in the Arabian Peninsula. The actual, and perceived, future instability caused by the Iraqi invasion had a dramatic and immediate outcome on the oil based economic fabric of the world economy. The adverse economic impact, and predicted future adverse impact, generated by this instability, drove America to lead a coalition force to end this instability, and restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. America was ready and willing to defend the country of Kuwait, with the lives of its service men and women. The question remains; is there a contradiction in policy that America responded with ground forces to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, while answering cries of ethnic genocide in Kosovo with air power alone, and ignoring the plight of more than 1 million Rwandans who died in 1994?

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I. Preface

March 25, 1991, the pilot began to turn his Stealth Fighter away from the country of Serbia. Below he could see the precise destruction caused by the numerous “Smart Bombs” dropped that night. Leaving the fires behind him, the pilot, a veteran of the Gulf War, was taken back by the stark difference from the war in Iraq. Gone was the desert with its seas of Arabian sand, replaced by mountains, rolling hills, and beautiful countryside. Missing were the huge coalition forces of tanks, trucks and armored vehicles, columns so large they could have seen clearly from miles away. Below him tonight, not a single Allied truck, tank or man was within 100 miles of the enemy.

Events of the last 10 years have demonstrated a pattern in the use of military force.

This pattern shows a causal relationship between market considerations, regional stability, and American economic interest that leads to a threshold for using force. Additionally, these same factors drive the degree by which that force is used. Interestingly, even in our day of instant and graphic news, this pattern indicates that human suffering, an important ingredient in shaping response, will not in itself drive the US to use force.

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actions in Serbia, but not at the expense of large coalition casualties in a southeastern European land war. Eight years earlier America brought “overwhelming force” against the dictator Saddam Hussein. While the world was outraged by what CNN called the “Rape of Kuwait”, there was more than sovereignty at issue. Central to the American decision to use force, markets and economists were also outraged at the prospect of instability in the Arabian Peninsula. The actual, and perceived, future instability caused by the Iraqi invasion had a dramatic and immediate outcome on the oil based economic fabric of the world economy. The adverse economic impact, and predicted future adverse impact, generated by this instability, drove America to lead a coalition force to end this instability, and restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. America was ready and willing to defend the country of Kuwait, with the lives of its service men and women. The question remains; is there a contradiction in policy that America responded with ground forces to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, while answering cries of ethnic genocide in Kosovo with air power alone, and ignoring the plight of more than 1 million Rwandans who died in 1994?

II. Thesis

Instability occurring in various regions of the world impacts United States economic interests. The relationship of the unstable area to American economic interest determines the degree of this impact. Correspondingly, as American economic interest increases so does the degree to which America is willing to use force and the level of violence that force is allowed to employ.

In the post cold war period this thesis requires a refocus of American institutions that prepare, commit, control, effect or impact the use of military force.

III. Questions to be explored

This paper examines the consistency in policy for the employment of the military.

This paper answers the following questions: What interests are vital to America? What are the threats to these interests? What determines the level of military effort, and the destructiveness of the forces to be employed? What drives the decisions as to how America wages war? How does America decide the “acceptable level” of casualties (enemy, civilian or US)?

This paper analyzes the process by which American military force has been employed, or not employed, in three post cold war crises. The crises reviewed are the Gulf War, the Rwandan Crisis, and the Kosovo Air Campaign. This paper looks for a Rosetta Stone that deciphers the American policy and ensuing strategy for the application of force in the Desert of Arabia, the streets of Somalia, the mountains of Bosnia, and the skies of Kosovo.

Whether intentional or not, recent history indicates American use of force is related to economic consideration more than any other single factor. Understanding this fact provides a consistency (or stability) by which policy makers can forge a logical post cold war strategy. This fact also gives policy makers a framework from which to plan, organize and equip forces against the “threat” to regional stability.

IV. Outline

There is a direct relationship between market considerations due to regional instability and American decisions to wage war. This paper defines this economic relationship and the varying degree this relationship drives the use of force by developing the term “vitalness”.

From this foundation the paper analyzes three case studies that outline America's use of force in relationship to varying degrees of vital US interests. Next, the paper demonstrates how "regional instability" effects this American "vitalness". The analysis shows how the effect of regional instability on markets triggers the threshold for use of force. Further, the paper demonstrates that once the threshold of "vitalness" is reached for use of force, additional factors, such as human suffering or ethnic ties, impact the degree and type of force to be employed. The paper concludes with an examination of the relationship between economic considerations and regional stability has on American Institutions that deal with the military and international relations. The conclusion makes recommendations for these institutions in light of the globalized aspects of American "vitalness".

V. The Post Cold War--Defining the vitalness we fight for.

Since the end of the cold war there have been several historical examples that demonstrate how vitalness drives American military action. For the context of this paper economic "vitalness" is defined as measurement of the effect regional instability has, or is projected to have, on US markets. An analysis of three crises supports the thesis presented when viewed from the perspective of world markets. Further, these examples demonstrate how the level of American vitalness determines whether military force will be used, the destruction in the application of this, and the tolerance the American people will have for casualties (military and civilian, American and enemy).

A. Clear Vital Interest—Invasion of Kuwait.

In 1991, national polls showed a majority of the Americans supported sending more than 500 thousand troops, halfway around the world to oppose Saddam Hussein.¹ Saddam Hussein was merely one of countless dictators available on the world scene. Granted there were banners on CNN decrying the “rape of Kuwait”. Granted there was a clear injustice to the people of Kuwait. But the Iraqi crisis was not the greatest injustice of the time. What drove America’s response? What led to an amazing coalition of friends and former enemies? According to Joe Nye, author and economist:

It is no surprise, while it is true that the US was concerned with the prospect for the people of Kuwait, the Gulf War was about vital US interest—Oil. To quote one of the better placards at a peace march, If Kuwait exported broccoli, we wouldn't be there now.²

These thoughts are supported by the reaction of world markets to the events in Kuwait. Iraq’s invasion led to a short term down trend in the New York Stock Exchange and a dramatic drop in the Dow Jones.

In mid-July of 1990, the DJIA closed at a then record high of 2999.75 two days in a row and then reversed course. On the second day that the DJIA closed within a quarter point of 3000, July 17th, 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein gave a speech in which he issued a veiled threat against Kuwait. Within a week, the DJIA fell five percent from the psychologically important 3000 mark. At the time of this shift in sentiment, Iraq started massing troops on its border with Kuwait, although the drop in stock prices was not attributed to developments in the Persian Gulf at the time. In early-August of 1990, Iraq actually invaded Kuwait and stock prices plunged nearly 20 percent by October of that year.³

¹ Gallup poll data, www.gallup.com.

² Nye, Joseph S. Jr. “Why the Gulf War Served the National Interest.” *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1991.

³ Adams, J. “Ditto Dow 8000 and Saddam’s Revenge”, Online posting. Jan 1998, www.adv-energy.com/~virtual/sot/8000n.htm.

The gulf war represented a clearly defined interest of the United States—an American vitalness. The twenty-percent drop in the Dow Jones caused by the instability in Southwest Asia did get the attention of the American people and the American Elite. In the decade of the 1990's, the “rape of Kuwait” makes the Dow Jones top 10 list of stock market crises. Correspondingly, this serious threat to American vitalness was met with “overwhelming force”. The American population supported massive military might to resolve the situation. America and its allies were willing to take massive casualties, and inflict huge amounts of destruction to restore stability and remove the threat to American interests.

B. Atrocity with Little Vital Interest—Tragedy in Rwanda.

In a four-month period in 1994 soldiers of the Interahamwe (an MNRD militia) and the Rwandan army killed almost one million people. During the same period almost two million refugee's fled to Zaire, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania.⁴ Undoubtedly this crisis was one of the largest humanitarian tragedies of the last 50 years.

The American reaction in Rwanda was limited to financial support through international agencies, and limited airlift operations. While the Rwandan humanitarian need was high, the threshold for US military to take action against those committing atrocities was not reached. Looking past the human suffering for the vitalness of the American interest, there was none. This fact is unceremoniously supported by the relative non-reaction on any economic market. The crisis, while chilling, had no significant impact on American trade, American markets or world markets. Prospects for the crisis to spill into more economically

⁴ No Author Listed, “Rwanda, Conflict Background.” Peace Pledge Union, June 2000, www.ppu.org.uk/wars/n-text/n-africa/n-rwanda.html

strategic areas were also seen as unlikely. Even in the area of access to natural resources, there was almost no impact or concern by any major power. In a global economy, Rwanda, with its immense human tragedy and localized instability, had little demand for the attention of the great market powers and correspondingly no American vital interests.

C. Vitalness and Human Suffering--Crisis Kosovo.

The invasion of Kuwait and the tragedy in Rwanda establish both ends of the spectrum (or continuum) for American military use of force. Between these extremes of crises and corresponding vitalness there lies a case of limited vital interest coupled with limited human suffering. The crisis in Kosovo saw the atrocity of “ethnic cleansing”. This atrocity was by no means on the level of human tragedy in Rwanda, but a tragedy considered by some as the worst in Europe since the Nazi’s persecuted the Jews. The crisis was not on the same magnitude of the Kuwait invasion from the perspective of economic vitalness, yet it was close to the interests of American allies, the major NATO powers. Additionally, these European powers were concerned the crisis would possibly spread. To most Americans, the overtones of ethnic based atrocities, along with European economic and cultural ties, drove the need for a limited response to the crisis in Kosovo.

When President Slobadan Milosovic stepped up his attacks on ethnic Kosovar Albanians in August of 1998. The pronouncements for humanitarian intervention by President Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were so couched in caveats that they “hardly amounted to a set of governing principles for the use of force”.⁵ Yet on the airwaves of 21st century media, the crisis in Kosovo slowly rose to the level of concern to the world markets.

⁵ Kitfield, James, “Neither Total War Nor Total Victory”, Government Executive Online, 26 Jul, 1999. www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0799/072699b2.htm.

These “atrocities” rose to the level of world awareness and by January 1999 opinion polls showed a solid majority opinion supporting humanitarian intervention. The U.S. Senate quickly endorsed an air war.⁶

Played against the backdrop of the Persian Gulf War and the Rwanda crisis, the action in Kosovo defines the factors leading to American use of force--regional stability and impact on markets. American response was driven by a blend of moral outrage, strategic interests, limited vital interests and an assumption that the operation would not exact too heavy a price. With a limited vital interest, tolerance for allied casualties was limited and the use of American ground forces was ruled out. America would act, but with the limited, low risk, high technology means afforded by airpower.

Airpower gave cause for the Serbian forces to rethink their actions. Airpower took time; time that left the masses relatively unprotected. It took a 79-day air campaign to stop atrocities from happening. Airpower with its punitive use, and perhaps even coercive utility, took two and a half months to prevent the murder and forced expulsions that originally served as NATO's justification for intervening. Neither was air power the sole cause of the belated success. In the opinion of British General Sir Michael Rose, former Commander of UN Ground Troop in Bosnia:

After 11 weeks of one of the most intensive air campaigns in the history of warfare, it is clear that NATO tragically failed to accomplish its objectives of preventing further violence against Kosovo's ethnic Albanians, wrote Rose. The result was thousands of people brutally murdered and more than a million people driven from their homes. The fundamental message is that it is not possible to safeguard a people by bombing from 15,000 feet.⁷

⁶Kitfield, James, “Neither Total War Nor Total Victory”, *Government Executive Online*, 26 Jul, 1999. www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0799/072699b2.htm.

Once the prospect for growing instability was contained, the real and perceived impact on American vitalness was mitigated. Contained instability reduced the compelling interest to stop humanitarian suffering. The risks associated with continuing into a ground war were not warranted. The military employment in Kosovo both directly and indirectly supported the global nature of the markets, and the moral conscience of world leaders.

The initial news of the escalating crisis in Kosovo immediately impacted all of the economies of Europe. Within days of the start of the conflict, traders marked Eurodollar down to its lifetime low set on March 29, 1999.⁸ To the regional and world markets the Kosovo instability threatened to spill into other countries. A fear ensued that Russia would come to Serbia's aid and escalate the conflict. According to one major market watcher "Western financial markets will likely ignore NATO's punishing bombing campaign against Yugoslavia as long as ground troops are not sent into battle and Russia stays out of the conflict."⁹ As it turned out, Russia remained neutral and the bombing campaign had the effect of containing the crisis and the threat to regional stability. In Kosovo's case the driving concern was containment of the regional instability and the focus on long term stability. According to Ms Penny MacRae, economic writer for Reuters,

There could be a move to safe havens if worst-case scenarios — such as neighboring countries being plunged into the conflict, NATO launching a land offensive or Russia becoming involved militarily — come into play. You would see a flight to quality out of equities into fixed income instruments and into the dollar and possibly into gold¹⁰

⁷ Kitfield, James. "Neither Total War Nor Total Victory", Government Executive Online, July 26, 1999. www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0799/072699b2.htm.

⁸ Reuters, "Kosovo Hits Euro; Stocks Surge With Dow". 13 April 1999. www.foxmarketwire.com/041399/europe.sml.

⁹ MacRae, Penny., "Western Markets Unfazed by Balkan Bombs". 26 March 1999. www.foxmarketwire.com/032699/kosovo.sml.

¹⁰ MacRae, Penny. "Western Markets Unfazed by Balkan Bombs". 26 March 1999. www.foxmarketwire.com/032699/kosovo.sml.

When it comes to determining use of military force in the post cold war environment, the financial markets and their experts appear to have the greatest grasp of vital American interest. Sir Michael Rose, for all his military genius, needed only to consult an investment firm to understand the most likely grand strategy to be undertaken in the Kosovo conflict. Looking for a thread to the Gulf War economists noted that “in the Gulf War, security of oil supplies was a vital issue. But the small size of the Balkan economies and their puny trade flows mean that economic upheaval in the region would have little impact on western countries.”¹¹ According to Gooheon Kwon, senior economist at ABN Amro, “It's more a sentiment issue than actual economic impact, but it is potentially damaging if it spreads. War is not a good friend of the market.”¹²

VI. Defining “Vitalness”.

The post cold war environment has found national military strategy no longer driven by threat of enemy capability but the threat to “vitalness” of American interests. This vitalness dictates the acceptable level of casualties, the amount of allowable destruction, and the specific makeup of air, land and sea forces to be employed.

¹¹ MacRae Penny. “Western Markets Unfazed by Balkan Bombs”. 26 March 1999. www.foxmarketwire.com/032699/kosovo.sml.

¹² MacRae Penny. “Western Markets Unfazed by Balkan Bombs”. 26 March 1999. www.foxmarketwire.com/032699/kosovo.sml.



Figure 1, Ten Years of Dow Jones Data.¹³

The concept of vitalness quantifies the importance regional instability, i.e., a crisis, has on American interests. Data from the American Stock Markets over the past 10 years gives a quantifiable value to vitalness. In turn this vitalness impacts national strategy and military response. This data demonstrates that American economic prosperity and its markets respond poorly to instability. The impact of instability is correlated with the direct-indirect economic interest the area has to the US economy. This effect may be amplified by human tragedy, but

¹³ Dow Jones, "The Dow Data". www.averages.dowjones.com/home.htm.

in itself only those things that impact, or are perceived to impact, the market will be considered vital to American interests and result in some form of use of force.

VII. 21st Century Strategy--Globalism, Trade and Stability.

Forty years ago there was simplicity in motivating the “people” of Clausewitz’s trinity in the face of a communist threat defined first and foremost in ideological terms. Reaction to communism was amplified by a combination of proximity and capability. Establishment of NATO following the fall of Yugoslavia and Poland to communism in the late 1940’s exemplifies the magnitude of this reaction. A second example is the Cuban missile crisis when soviet missiles that were moved off the coast of Florida, America prepared to go to nuclear war to stop it.

Today’s strategic threat involves the destabilizing actions of rogue actors waging ethnic wars, and attempts by rogue nations to illegally expand their borders. These threats occur in countries most Americans can not locate on a map. Yet similar to cold war containment, the issues, the location, and the actors are unimportant. What is important is that crisis and instability affect the global economy. While the effects are important, the American public, in light of the global nature of world markets, is unknowingly linked to worldwide stability.

Each year the vitalness of US interest reaches farther and farther into the four corners of the earth. America’s prosperity is increasingly tied to a global market place. As it was fifty years ago when the threat of communism could pull America’s military to a country half a world away, so does the global nature of America’s interest today make similar demands on our military. The vitalness of American interest depends on the action taken to stop instability, or the spread of instability to areas important to US markets.

Vitalness can be seen in a direct or indirect link. The direct link is demonstrated between Mideast instability and the economic effect on oil prices. Events in this area demonstrate the link American auto owners understand. The result was overwhelming support and legitimacy of the Gulf war. The less direct link can be seen by the effect instability in Kosovo had on European markets, and European consumption of US export. Kosovo instability and potential for greater regional instability led to the use of force by the NATO countries. Yet this less direct link, with a lower degree of vitalness, limited American tolerance for casualties and ruled out ground troops.

Far from the fields of Arabian oil, the almost non-existent world economic consequence of the Sub-Saharan crisis has consistently deterred any US involvement in the region. The large-scale humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and the Republic of Congo in the last decade have resulted in millions of lives lost, and no US military intervention.

VIII. Strategy for the 21st Century.

The pragmatic approach, linking market interests of the US and regional stability, has governed U.S. actions for much of the 1990s. During 1999, donor governments gave just \$8 per person in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country facing a huge humanitarian crisis. During this same period the UN was providing \$207 per person in aide to the former Yugoslavia. While both regions have significant needs, world decision-makers have demonstrated little commitment to universal entitlement based on humanitarian need alone.¹⁴ The reality of relative vitalness explains how only 2,100 troops and 57 air transports were sent

¹⁴ No Author Listed, "A Forgotten War - A Forgotten Emergency: The Democratic Republic of Congo" Oxfam GB Policy Paper, December 200. <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/drc.htm>.

to help with refugee relief in Rwanda, despite mass genocide.¹⁵ This subtle, but clear logic explains the United States' quick withdrawal from the humanitarian mission in Somalia as casualties' occurred. It should be no surprise to anyone, least of all the UN commander of ground troops, that the United States would respond in Kosovo with a limited and low casualty air war.

This framework linking vitalness and military action provides a consistent, realist approach to dealing with world affairs. There is no inconsistency in the decision to support a massive, costly ground war in the gulf, and limited relief in Rwanda.

A. From Containment to Globalism.

Fifteen years ago the American military structure was focused on meeting and defeating an extremely real Soviet threat. This threat, with its substantial military forces, could jeopardize America's very existence. Today, America has the capability to bring overwhelming military force, or if need be nuclear force, to any military situation. There no longer exists a single power capable of threatening America's existence. The threats today are the regional, destabilizing forces, that impact free trade, open markets, in regions of interest to America and her people.

The interests of the United States are economically tied to almost every region of the world. The American economy relies on the production of semiconductors of Malaysia, the production of zinc in South America, exports of software to China, imports of BMWs from Germany. America's prosperity today and in the future, relies on global markets and global stability.

¹⁵ Kitfield, James., "Neither Total War Nor Total Victory", Government Executive Online, July 26, 1999, www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0799/072699b2.htm.

B. Nine factors for Use of Military Force.

The realities of the 1990s have demonstrated a national strategy linking military response to regional stability. Military response is driven by US vitalness defined as impact on imports, exports, financial markets, prospects for success, risks in taking action and not taking action. These ideas of vitalness lead to a “realist” approach for use of military force. The table below looks at various factors that have governed the use of military force in the past decade. Additionally the table looks at two notional examples that bound the idea of vitalness.

Impetus for Military Involvement: Source of American Use of Force						
	Rwanda	Somalia	Gulf	Kosovo	Natural Disaster	WWII
1. Focus						
Humanitarian	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mil Action	Possible	Possible	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Mix	Likely	Likely	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
2. Effect of High Tech	Low	Low	High	High	Med	High
3. Force required						
Air	No	No	Yes	High	Yes	Yes
Ground	Yes	Yes	Yes	No-Limit Risk	Yes	Yes
Sea	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SOF	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Nuke	No	No	Possible	No	No	Yes
4. Risk in Acting	High	High	High	Medium- if limit ground force	Low	High
5. Risk No Action	Low	Low	High	Medium	Varies	High
6. Chance for Success	Low	Low	High	High	High	High
7. Vitalness	Low	Low	High	Medium	Varies	High
8. Casualty Tolerance	Low	Low	Med	Medium	Low	High
9. Risk to Region Stability	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Varies	High

Table 2: Decision Consideration Matrix for Military Action

The crisis will dictate the degree, type of force, and strategy to be employed. This table shows the requirement for use of force will be driven not by the threat, but by the vitalness of the area, chance for success, effectiveness of American weapon and military force, risk of action and risk of inaction. The economic aspects minimize ideological concepts, and in doing so minimize perceptions of US hegemony if force is employed properly. The scale of American military reaction will be related first and foremost to the degree of US vitalness.

IX. What Post Cold War History has to say for American Institution Involved with Military Force.

In the globalized economic environment of the 21st century, the Clausewitz theory of war as an extension of politics is more relevant today than it was 200 years ago. For the first time in history the world is effectively unipolar; ironically the sole superpower is interested in a status quo theory of democracy. America's thirst for open markets and personal freedom have far outweighed any desire impress upon the world its government, its religion or its way of life.

Today the United States finds itself in an incredibly linked global market place. The last decade shows that super power intervention in war was not based on a good versus evil ideological basis (like that of the French revolution, Communism versus Capitalism, Democracy versus Fascism), but to maintain regional stability. The strategy implied by the last decade is one where military force is used to maintain stability, stop egregious ethnic genocide, enable world trade, and continue to ensure regional vitality of markets. The strategy recognizes that regional economic interest (vitalness) drives American military response. This simple concept dramatically impacts the perspective of those institutions

involved in the use of military force. This concept helps policy makers bring order to the seemingly ambiguous nature of employing forces short of the doctrine of overwhelming force in the post cold crises.¹⁶

The case for a strategy that links American interest to regional stability, while recognizing the global nature of world markets and their impact on American prosperity is clear. The use of force is defined by of “vitalness” of the US interest. From this foundation, American institutions impacting the decision, the ability, and the degree to which force can be applied requires review.

No study of post cold war strategy could be complete without looking at the institutions that impact the decision, structure and degree to which America uses military force is used. The following discussion suggests moving the focus of these institutions, with respect to military force, away from a cold war containment, to one that correlates or understands threats to stability and the impact vitalness has on the spectrum of applied force.

A. The People and Economy.

Direct threats against the United States will be dealt with through all means available. This fact is unargued, yet the realities of the post cold war show that the public needs to understand that the use of force revolves around the vitalness of the crisis area. The history of the last ten years shows the American people and economy are linked, to varying degrees with instability in various regions of the world. This vitalness drives US decisions and prosecution of conflict.

¹⁶ Powell, Colin L. “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 71 Winter 1992, pp. 32-45.

In the post cold war, a realization of the economic ties and the vitalness of the area begins to explain the unwillingness of the American people to accept US military casualties, casualties of US and foreign national civilians, and unnecessary/preventable collateral damage. Citizens understand the value of stability and the need for it to support prosperity and world markets. Yet with only economic idealism at stake, recent history shows US population will demand moderation of destruction relative to the “vitalness” of the national interest. This psychology leads to popular support and infatuation with advanced weapons, precision weapons, and non-lethal weapons.

America has varying degrees of tolerance with regards to popular support. “All you need is one picture,” said John MacArthur, publisher of Harper's magazine, recalling the effect of the photo of a U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets of Somalia. “One downed pilot being held prisoner, and you can turn the whole thing around.”¹⁷ The role of the people is critical in a free democratic society. The battered American Pilot seen on Iraqi television intensified US resolve against Saddam Hussien, yet death in the streets of Somalia resulted in US withdrawal from that country. Further from America vitalness was the relative lack of reaction, both in popular coverage, and outrage for support to stop events in Rwanda or the republic of Congo. The American people did not perceive a “vitalness” of national interests in these cases, regardless of the humanitarian suffering.

The ability of the US to react and contain a regional crisis will mean that, as vitalness decreases so will acceptance of loss, collateral damage and expenditure of resources. As humanitarian-suffering increases, the nation will feel compelled to act but there is no clear historical data to support that the amount of suffering significantly changes the vitalness to

America, and the corresponding use of, or risk to, military force. To respond to these situations, the American people require a military force that relies on methods and technologies that reduce risk to American servicemen and noncombatant civilians. In limited wars, aimed at limiting human suffering, with limited vitalness, America will look to non-US personnel in a ground contact role. To effectively garner public support, decision-makers must educate the American public on the vitalness when a crisis occurs. Americans need to understand that properly prepared military forces are an investment in American Vital interest and directly impact the prosperity of America in global markets. Additionally, new, highly technical, low risk tools and techniques will be required if American popular support is expected when the military is used to meet the moral demand to halt human tragedy.

B. The Government--Time to get Consensus!

This paper views the United States Government in its application of force as a two-headed entity, the executive and the legislative. Legitimacy for use of force is increased through bi-partisan support for US involvement. During the 1999 Kosovo Air Campaign seventeen US congressmen charged the President in federal court. The congressmen alleged that the,

Defendant William Jefferson Clinton is unconstitutionally conducting an offensive military attack against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without obtaining a declaration of war or other explicit authorization from Congress and despite Congress' decision not to authorize such action.¹⁸

¹⁷ No Author Listed, "Media crackdown could shape U.S. reaction to attacks". Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Online, March 27, 1999, www.chippewafallsnews.com/news/kosovo/0327media.asp.

¹⁸ Barret, Ted. "Seventeen US Congressman File Suite against Clinton to end War". Cable News Network, April 30 1999. <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/30/war.suit>.

When vitalness is clear to US citizen's legitimacy and popular support increases and ultimately allows the political and military leaders more latitude to prosecute the war. Popular support for the operation, in turn, leads to increased cooperation between the executive and legislative. Following the success of the Gulf War even those who spoke against involvement remarked how they had supported the action.

Previous administrations have argued time constraints kept them from gaining congressional approval prior to action. However, the same concepts that moderate use of overwhelming force for economic results allows a democracy time to ensure bicameral support for the use of force. In the case of the Kosovo conflict the National Command Authority began to move strategic, offensive air assets in support of a air campaign against Yugoslavia in August of 1998, yet a bomb didn't drop until late march 1999.¹⁹ Although time was available, this eight-month period saw little domestic consensus built for the operation. President Clinton's public address in late March of 1999, explaining to the American people the location of Kosovo, as bombs were loaded on aircraft was almost after the fact.²⁰

Recent history does not validate the notion that a crisis may demand swift military action. The suffering in Rwanda showed tolerance for inaction. The increase in Ethnic Albanian deaths from the time the first bomb landed to seventy three days later when NATO forces peacefully entered Kosovo indicate a tolerance for delay. NATO's decision to launch the air campaign while ruling out the use of ground forces caused the failure to achieve two of the three objectives of President Clinton listed the day the bombing started. "To deter an even

¹⁹ Randall, Wesley S. Notes from personal involvement in the 1999 Kosovo Air Campaign, Dec 2000.

²⁰ Randall, Wesley S. Personal involvement in Operation Allied Force.

bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo." ²¹

The Gulf War demonstrates a successful contrast. The same period of eight-months was used by President George Bush's administration to actively gain overwhelming national, congressional and senatorial support for actions in Desert Storm. This serves as an example for the proper bicameral support prior to use of military force. Gaining this support is the responsibility of both the executive and legislative branches. Externally the world must see a seamless representation of American resolve for use of force. Arguments that the action can not wait, has historically fallen on deaf ears; there is time.

C. Implications for the President.

The President must lead in defining the vitalness of the situation. He must be able to link the importance of regional stability to national prosperity and global markets. He must be able to influence both the people and the legislature with open and forthright dialogue. The executive must educate the nation on the American policy for use of military force as to why he thinks it is important. He must ensure that forces are given a clear objective, and that they are properly trained and equipped for the task. As demonstrated in Somalia, the executive must be mindful of possible escalation and articulate the probable and acceptable losses of men and material and he must articulate the specifics of the national interest. In the case of responding to large-scale humanitarian crisis the task will be more difficult. While reaction to these events is morally commendable, this reaction must be moderated with a very real impact on national interest and market impact. The executive and his staff must strive to

²¹ Daalder, Ivo H. "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo". Brookings Institute. Fall 1999. <http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/daalder/19990920FP.htm>.

clearly demonstrate the impact on prosperity at the State level and regional instability. The link between Persian Gulf oil and vital United States interest is clear. With a less defined link, the President must increase the public's awareness of the "vitalness" of the situation. Often the connection may not be apparent, it will be up to the Executive to make the this link clear. For example, here is a hypothetical example of a situation in Malaysia. A Malaysian crisis arises and the President sees the need for intervention or assistance. He must make the case that Malaysian instability affect the production of computer chips, which affects the sales of Gateway computers. The connections are not always obvious and making the link is a matter of national leadership.

D. The Legislative Branch—The will of the People.

The legislature must be willing to compromise, in a bipartisan way, so that world opinion sees America's military employed with united support. The legislature must comprehend the global interest of their constituents and they must articulate to them the interrelated nature of the global economy. The legislature must fill a critical role in educating both the executive and constituents of the vitalness of the area in concern, whether Iowa computer sales or Nebraska beef production. The legislature must fill the critical need to demonstrate to the American people the legitimacy of American action.

The legislature also must understand, and then articulate to its constituents that the military is an investment in national prosperity. The legislature must convey the military is a national asset that ensures world market stability and this stability provides greater national prosperity, greater GNP, and greater revenue. Just as America sees state and local law enforcement as a stabilizing force for the local market place, so too must America see the military's role in stabilizing the global market place. Legislatures must understand the

military's ability to act with legitimate force as an economic force multiplier that builds popular support, trust of the people, and of the world and thus promoting American prosperity in a very real dollar for dollar manner.

The legislative branch must fund a military that is prepared to deal with the new strategic environment. This military will require the ability to respond quickly and decisively around the world to reactively contain aggression and restore regional stability. The legislature must accept investment costs that transform the military for the post cold war environment. The legislature needs to focus its support on programs that provide an exponential increase in combat capability.

E. The Commander, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

Clausewitz described the genius of the military as the commander. This paper considers the Clausewitz commander in the form of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The Chairman defines the administrative, planning, genius and employment of America's military.

The role of the commander is to translate national strategy into military strategy. In time of conflict the CJCS advises the civilian policy makers as to recommended action and employment requirements. The use of force, in the highly open and political environment of the United States government makes it imperative that the Chairman be forthright with the legislative branch and the executive. The Chairman must represent the role and character of the nation's military to the American people. The Chairman must be known and respected by the legislative branch, while loyally supporting the executive.

When the decision is made to employ the military, the Chairman must ensure the operational Commander and Chief (CINC) is given the means and authority to conduct the

operation in a manner consistent with sound military practice. The Chairman and the CINC must be prepared to conduct the military actions to restablize the areas of crisis, and he must be prepared to engage with a force commensurate with the vitalness. The Chairman's critical role will be to ensure doctrine, equipment, support, and rules of engagement are available to the CINC. With these tools he should be able to handle the situation and protect American servicemen in the difficult, limited engagements of the future.

F. Implications for Doctrine and Strategy--Will the real doctrine please stand up?

The Gulf War saw America successfully employ the "overwhelming force" discussed in the Powell Doctrine.²² In the numerous conflicts since the Gulf War, the Powell Doctrine, the "on the books" doctrine for American military engagement, has seen little reaffirmation.²³ In place of overwhelming force we see an increased focus on "zero tolerance" casualties, and limited collateral damage. This new "limited" doctrine was particularly evident during the war in Kosovo. The Powell Doctrine does not account for, and does not support, the NATO action in Kosovo. The force was not overwhelming, and the national interests were limited. In light of recent history, globalism, and current technology, it may be time to reassess the doctrine from which the US will engage in varying degrees of conflict.

The policy of the last decade shows a relationship between degrees of vitalness and the use of military force. In a global market place American vital interest is defined by economic interrelationships. These relationships drive the employment of US forces, the

²² Powell, Colin L. "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, The foundation of Gen Powell's doctrine is that that American troops should never be committed to battle without overwhelming force and overwhelming popular support.

²³ Kitfield, James. "Neither Total War Nor Total Victory", Government Executive Online, Jul 26, 1999. www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0799/072699b2.htm.

support of US population, and the acceptance of US casualties. This relationship driven the development of a post cold war diplomacy linking regional instability, American interest and use of military force. On this foundation, in limited conflicts, strategy will enhance American legitimacy if large, manpower intensive American forces are minimized. The US should leverage its ability to supply expensive hardware, air power, and high technology. America should take interest in building up the ability for the United Nations to establishment its own command and control structure for smaller scale conflicts. As the inherent risks increase with use of ground forces in limited conflicts, America should move to emphasize the use of regional manpower. A positive consequence of this reduced risk associated with reductions of American military personnel is reduced animosity directed at highly visible American ground troops, slower ops tempo, and reduction in world perception of US hegemony.

US strategy must be flexible in maintaining regional stability. The degree of response to a crisis would correlate with the degree of vitalness of US interest. Following this edict, America would avoid tendencies to “exact a price” for aggression. The strategy should not attempt to roll back the aggressor beyond initial borders. The strategy need not focus on destroying the army of the aggressor for years to come. In limited conflict the strategy should focus on the aggressive government and not its people.

G. Military force structure--prepared for limited and unlimited war.

While the Department of Defense must be constantly prepared for its overarching duty deter and defend American against attack, the threat has changed. As a result, our threat-based defense no longer requires large standing forces and budgets. The current threat does not require a massive, lethal response, but one that is light, quick, lean, lethal and precise. However this new “threat” has seen the United States increasing, not decreasing its use of the

military arm of the extension of policy. Yet each of these engagements was different, the types of forces employed and the amount of casualties accepted are all unique. Faced with an increase in worldwide, rapid deployments, today's military element of national power must become lighter, leaner and more mobile.

Over the last five years, many questions have been raised about the correct force structure as we reorganize to face a doctrinally and ideologically new worldwide threat. Today's army is attempting to create a light force prepared for today's strategic environments. The United States Air Force has restructured organizationally into an expeditionary force prepared in a realization of the need to promote, quickly and decisively, regional stability. It is the very nature of the Department of the Navy to respond regionally and with varying degree of force to worldwide crisis. Yet, there are huge implications on force structures and budgets to carry through with these required actions to meet this new "threat". The transition costs will be high, but a worthwhile investment that will pay dividends on the Gross National Product and vital interests of America.

The reformed forces need to focus on the characteristics that tie to vitalness of interests, will of the people, risk of action, and chance of success. The military should consider the following characteristics when shaping the force:

1.	Precision Ordnance
2.	Unmanned Systems
3.	Non lethal weapons
4.	Ability to limited/lower collateral damage
5.	Overwhelming capability to disrupt and if necessary destroy enemy infrastructure

6.	Ability to take the war to the enemy leadership
7.	Ability to bypass fielded army
8.	Ability to destroy high value assets in heavily defended or heavy civilian density areas
9.	Avoidance of taking the war to the people directly
10.	Ability to take the war to the people indirectly.
11.	Capability to quickly destroy the enemy fielded force.

Table 3: Characteristics of the 21st Century Military

America must consider using regional and or United Nations troops whenever vitalness is limited. America must establish a strategy for limited engagement that minimizes the risks to American troops and perceptions of American hegemony. America should consider investment in actions to train and transfer heavy manpower intensive systems to regional allies.

As the military role is framed and enabled by global economic relationships it is incumbent upon America to use its wealth to bridge the gap between acceptable levels of US casualties and the ability to act to prevent humanitarian suffering. America must review previous crises where there was a moral desire for the country to act but capability to act was constrained by risks inherent in the current force structure, training and doctrine. America must strive to pursue peacetime training, interaction and interoperability with allied military. In this way America will be able to act with lower risk while meeting the moral objective to alleviate suffering.

H. Dealing with Allies, its their Nickel.

American military force must be prepared for quick legitimate response to restabilize areas effecting US interest vitalness. The key task facing America will be her ability to act without creating or reinforcing the perception of American hegemony. Kosovo demonstrated a new avenue for American legitimacy. This legitimacy, properly used, alleviates perceptions of American hegemony. This legitimacy is inherent in a global economy where the leading economic societies are linked in the world market. Instability that adversely effects world markets adversely effects regional markets to an ever greater degree. In a globalized market, the major regional players have an increased, common concern for stability. During the Kosovo conflict the NATO forces recognized this fact and sent letters to the prominent businessmen of Serbia promising their business would suffer if they did not get Milosovic to comply.

The negative effect regional instability has on regional markets makes it easier to gain a United Nations mandate aimed at increasing stability. This phenomenon can increase legitimacy for America as the regional actors have more to gain by American involvement. The American economy, by virtue of its size, is more capable of weathering the effect of instability anywhere in the world. America can take to time and build consensus, while the impetus to act will be greatest in the regional actors. The size of the American economy allows adverse economic conditions driven by regional instability to be merely dampened in comparison to our regional allies.

An example of this axiom was shown by the effect instability in the Balkans had on regional and world markets during the Kosovo campaign. Instability in Kosovo effected the

European market, yet it also effected other major world markets to a lessor extent. Market watchers noted that as long as air strikes were used, and not ground forces, with pilots returning safely the American and European markets remained stable. However, if the conflict had developed into a land war, the negative impact on European markets would have been tremendous, particularly the markets of southern and eastern Europe.²⁴ This illustrates the requirement for the regional powers to act in their own interests, and thus in the interest of America from a market perspective.

Properly managed, the United States can benefit from regionally enforced stability containment. The impetuous will exist for regional actors to recognize the need for the capability to contain adverse instability. Well managed, this is likely to lead to greater joint development and interoperability among allied partners. Looking again to Kosovo, James McKay, commonwealth Bank of Australia warned against complacency on behalf of the Europeans, noting that "If (the conflict) does look likely to become quite drawn out...you could even say it might become Europe's Vietnam if there isn't an early settlement." ²⁵

America must look for regional support, (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and United Nations support for use of force. However, the increasingly globalized nature of the world markets should make this task simpler as regional powers have even more at stake from a market perspective.

²⁴ MacRae, Penny., "Western Markets Unfazed by Balkan Bombs". 26 March 1999. www.foxmarketwire.com/032699/kosovo.sml.

²⁵ Fullerton, Elizabeth. "Central European Markets Stable if Russia Stays Out." Reuters, 26 March 1999, <http://www.foxmarketwire.com/032699/kosovoside.sml>.

I. Diplomacy, Unlike the Cold War, it's not dead yet.

Some aspects of diplomacy in the post cold war environment may involve dealing with aggressor nations with whom America has little ideologically in common. Yet, unlike the cold war, military and diplomatic ties have become increasingly close in the limited wars of today. These limited wars drive a unique perspective for the Clausewitz thesis of war as an extension of policy. Wars are not only an extension of politics but also a clear extension of economics interests.

The high technology and precision weapons available today give the policy maker discrete force application possibilities that were previously unheard of in support of national strategy. These capabilities allow the diplomat to shape the negotiation in ways never before imagined. Hypothetically, during a break in negotiations with a particularly obstinate foe, a statesman could conceivably call for a precise, low collateral damage, strike against a high value asset. Reconvening negotiation the enemies will is shaped as the American negotiator briefly notes a television account of the enemy's latest loss. As an instrument of national power the U.S. statesmen has in his hand a remarkable tool. The wise diplomat will understand the broad ranging possibilities of these types of military assets, and it's ability to engage globally.

Equally important will be the diplomat's efforts to work to shape the strategic environment in times of peace. The time to develop allied cooperation, interoperability, joint use weapons, training and alliances will be in times of peace. As the military adjusts to the theories of world globalization and its impact on force structure, so to must the diplomat restructure state diplomacy with an eye to the same environment. In times of peace the

diplomat must be called upon to use all forms of national power to protect and enhance American interests in the regional market place.

The diplomat must also make efforts to ensure that legislators and the public understand the importance of the region and its relative vitalness as an American interest. It is incumbent upon the diplomat to supply the data that demonstrates that the use of military force to restore stability will positively impact American interests.

X. Conclusion--Vitalness of US interests, Regional Stability, Use of Military Force.

Carl Clausewitz said, “if we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.”²⁶ In a democracy founded on principles of personal freedom and market capitalism the driving forces of that political purpose today are globalism and world markets. As military force is used in limited wars it is critical to remember that the “the original motive for the war...(that) thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires”.²⁷ Post cold war history is littered with examples where the object to be reached became disconnected from the military effort required.

The strategy for the 21st century, with America at the center of a unipolar world, is not and cannot be to attempt to export capitalism or the “American way”. The goal for America may very well be to maintain the status quo. American institutions that impact the use of force must recognize the market forces that determine the relative vitalness of American interest. These institutions must understand the value of regional stability and the military’s

²⁶ Clausewitz, Clausewitz, Carl V., On War. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. P. 87.

²⁷ Clausewitz, Carl V., On War. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. P. 87.

role as an economic enabler in maintaining this stability. The lessons of the 1990's have shown us how the global nature of world markets in many ways defines the vitalness of our interests in a regional conflict. More than humanitarian suffering economic consequence is what drives the level and commitment of American involvement. Questions of casualties, collateral damage and effort expended are relative to the vitalness of our interests.

As military force is considered, the recognition of the varying degrees of response must shape peacetime actions. America must examine strategy from the perspective people/economy, the government, the commander, the allies, the diplomat, doctrine, strategy and military force structure.

The goal of this American military strategy must be to protect US interests, ensure the safety of world markets, the flow of free goods, and the alleviation of human suffering while avoiding the appearance of the US as the world hegemony. American policy must promote regional stability, while building markets. When force is brought to bear the goal must be reestablishment of borders, not to "exact a price" for aggression. When crisis demands American involvement the military must be prepared to provide high technology, command and control, and precision weapons; in short the high cost means of war. At the same time movement must be made to develop ways to integrate manpower intensive systems and land armies from regional allies.

The effect regional instability has on United States economic interests is the most consistent indicator for decision to use military force and the violence which that force will use. This fact calls for a refocus of American institutions that prepare, commit, impact, control, effect or determine the use of military force. By doing this American might can be

brought to bear while limiting American risk and avoiding large scale American personnel involvement and perceptions of American hegemony. In this way America and its vital interests in the global economy can be looked after with increasing legitimacy.

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